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Abstract
Over the past four decades, advanced economies experienced a large growth in
gross external portfolio positions. This phenomenon has been described as Financial
Globalization. Over roughly the same time frame, most of these countries also saw a
substantial fall in the level and variability of inﬂation. Many economists have conjec-
tured that ﬁnancial globalization contributed to the improved performance in the level
and predictability of inﬂation. In this paper, we explore the causal link running in
the opposite direction. We show that a monetary policy rule which reduces inﬂation
variability leads to an increase in the size of gross external positions, both in equity
and bond portfolios. This appears to be a robust prediction of open economy macro
models with endogenous portfolio choice. It holds across diﬀerent modeling speciﬁ-
cations and parameterizations. We also present preliminary empirical evidence which
shows a negative relationship between inﬂation volatility and the size of gross external
positions.
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1 Introduction
Data on external asset positions show that the gross size of country portfolios has increased
substantially over the past four decades. Over the same period the volatility of inﬂation has
declined in most countries as monetary authorities have shifted the focus of monetary policy
towards inﬂation stabilization and away from output stabilization. This paper investigates
whether these two phenomena are related. The question we address is: has the increased
monetary policy focus on nominal stability resulted in greater ﬁnancial globalization?
We are not the ﬁrst to explore the link between ﬁnancial globalization and inﬂation.
But to our knowledge, all the literature has focused on the causation going in the other
direction. For instance, many authors have suggested that increasing globalization in goods
and ﬁnancial markets has led to a decline in national inﬂation rates, either through direct
market mechanisms or by inﬂuencing the behavior of monetary authorities1.
We do not dispute the possibility that ﬁnancial globalization may inﬂuence inﬂation,
either directly through trade eﬀects or indirectly through aﬀecting the conduct of monetary
policy. But we argue in this paper that there is a very strong theoretical case that the link
may also go the other way. We ﬁnd that monetary policy which reduces the variability
of domestic inﬂation leads to an increase in the diversiﬁcation of international portfolios,
generating higher gross external assets and liabilities. We show that this result is robust
across a variety of modeling speciﬁcations and parameter assumptions.2 In addition, we
provide some preliminary empirical evidence for this link.
We provide a theoretical investigation of the impact of monetary policy and nominal
stability on the size of external asset positions in a general model in which gross external
ﬁnancial positions are endogenous. The model is a two-country DSGE structure with Calvo-
1For instance, Rogoﬀ (2004, 2006) suggests that increasing economic openness may steepen the trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and output, and reduce the equilibrium inﬂation rate chosen by monetary authorities.
Chen et al. (2004) ﬁnd empirical evidence that increasing openness, by reducing non-competitive distortions
in domestic markets, reduces the inﬂation bias in monetary policy. In addition, it has been suggested that
there are direct disinﬂationary forces imparted by international trade (Pain et al. 2006, Borio and Filardo
2007). Alternatively, ﬁnancial globalization could aﬀect inﬂation indirectly by imposing a ‘disciplining eﬀect’
on domestic monetary policy. This link is explicitly tested in Tytell and Wei (2004). They ﬁnd evidence
that ﬁnancial globalization has led to lower inﬂation rates. Related research by Kose et al. (2007) suggest
that there are ‘collateral’ beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalization coming from its eﬀect on the quality of domestic
economic policy. Stark (2011) also conjectures that ﬁnancial globalization was a contributing factor in
improved monetary policy performance in OECD countries.
2Note that we are not claiming that inﬂation stabilization is the only (or even the main) cause of ﬁnancial
globalization. We are simply showing that it may be one (possibly) quite important factor.
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style wage and price setting where monetary policy in each country is modeled as a Taylor
rule. There is international trade in nominal bonds and equities, and following recent litera-
ture, we compute equilibrium gross portfolios. The size of these portfolios will depend on the
structure and stochastic environment of the model, including the properties of the monetary
rule. The benchmark model displays home bias in equity holdings while each country holds
a long position in bonds denominated in their own currency. By varying the feedback coef-
ﬁcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule it is possible to analyze the relationship between the
anti-inﬂation stance of monetary policy, the variance of inﬂation and equilibrium portfolio
positions.
In the baseline parameterization of the model, as the policy feedback coeﬃcient on in-
ﬂation is increased, the variance of inﬂation falls and the absolute size of equilibrium gross
positions in both equities and bonds increase. So the model predicts a negative relationship
between the variance of inﬂation and the size of equity and bond portfolio positions.
The underlying cause of this negative relationship can be explained in terms of simple
expressions which show that the equilibrium gross portfolio position in any asset is propor-
tional to the variability of home income relative to foreign income and inversely related to
the variability of relative asset returns. Lower variability of relative asset returns compared
to the variability of relative income implies that gross portfolios have to be larger in order
to provide adequate hedging of income shocks. We show that the model implies that, as the
feedback coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule is increased, the variability of relative asset
returns decreases compared to the variability of relative income. This leads to an increase
in gross asset positions.
We further show that the size of gross positions depends on the correlation between
relative asset returns and cross-country income shocks. The more relative asset returns are
correlated with income shocks, the larger are equilibrium gross holdings. Our model shows
that, when asset markets are incomplete (meaning there are fewer independent assets than
there are sources of uncertainty) a reduction in inﬂation variability increases the correlation
between relative asset returns and income shocks. In eﬀect, inﬂation stabilization moves
the equilibrium closer to the complete markets outcome. This tends to raise the size of
equilibrium gross holdings.
There are thus two eﬀects which link a reduction in inﬂation variability to an increase in
the size of gross portfolio positions, a return volatility eﬀect and a return-income correlation
eﬀect. The model shows that both eﬀects can contribute to an expansion of gross asset
positions, the more that monetary policy is focused on inﬂation stabilization.
Numerical experiments with our model show that the negative relationship between inﬂa-
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tion variability and gross positions appears to be very robust across a wide range of parameter
variations and model variants. There is, however, some sensitivity to the precise form of the
monetary rule. For instance, if the Taylor rule is based on producer price inﬂation (PPI)
rather than consumer price inﬂation, gross equity holdings are (mildly) positively related to
inﬂation variability. We argue however that a rule based on consumer price inﬂation is a
better representation of monetary policy practice in the last four decades.
The relationship between gross positions and inﬂation volatility can be investigated em-
pirically using the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) data on gross external portfolio
positions. In order to put our theoretical results in context, we ﬁrst report panel regres-
sion estimates for advanced economies for the period 1972-2005 which show a statistically
signiﬁcant negative relationship between inﬂation variability and the size of gross portfolio
positions. This empirical result appears to be quite robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the
regression equation and diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the variables. In particular the results are
robust for overall gross positions and also the gross positions in bonds and equities separately.
The paper is part of a large literature on the theoretical and empirical underpinnings
of international capital ﬂows. On the theory side, Devereux and Sutherland (2010, 2011a)
and Tille and Van Wincoop (2010) develop techniques for computing equilibrium portfolios
in DSGE models. Applications to the ‘home bias’ puzzle include Coeurdacier et al (2010),
Engel and Matsumoto (2009), Heathcote and Perri (2007), and Benigno and Nistico (2009).
Empirically, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008a, 2008b) and Lane and Shambaugh (2010) have
explored the determinants of international portfolio positions. With respect to the relation-
ship between monetary policy rules and international portfolios, Devereux and Sutherland
(2008) note that a monetary policy focused on stabilizing producer price inﬂation can in-
crease nominal bond positions by enhancing the risk sharing properties of nominal bonds.
De Paoli et al (2010) examine the implication of diﬀerent types of monetary policy rules for
international portfolio positions and welfare. Neither Devereux and Sutherland (2008) nor
De Paoli at al (2010) focus on the relationship between CPI inﬂation volatility and gross
international portfolio positions in the way that is addressed in this paper.3
3Devereux and Sutherland’s (2008) main focus of analysis is optimal monetary policy in the presence
of endogenous portfolio choice. They use a theoretical model which is much less general than the model
described below. They do not directly analyze the relationship between inﬂation stabilization and the size
of portfolio positions. They simply note that, in their simple model (where asset trade is restricted to trade
in nominal bonds) that the size of gross bond positions increases as inﬂation is stabilized. The current paper
analyses a much more general model and shows that the size of gross positions in both equities and bonds
tend to rise as monetary policy focuses on inﬂation stabilization. We also set out a general framework for
understanding this result (which encompasses the eﬀect noted in Devereux and Sutherland, 2008) and tests
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There is also a large empirical literature on the determinants of international ﬁnancial
globalization. Okawa and vanWincoop (2010) develop a gravity based model of international
ﬁnancial linkages where bilateral ﬁnancial holdings are determined by basic principles of
portfolio diversiﬁcation, adjusted for relative informational asymmetries across countries.
They show that their model allows for a theory-based estimate of the size of ﬁnancial frictions.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008a, 2008b) and Faruqee et al (2004) use simple models of
portfolio diversiﬁcation to examine the determinants of bilateral cross border equity holdings.
None of these papers explore the inﬂuence of inﬂation on international ﬁnancial holdings,
however.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief empirical analysis of the rela-
tionship between gross asset positions and inﬂation variability over the period 1970-2007.
Section 3 describes our theoretical model. Section 4 derives some useful relationships which
aid in the analysis of gross positions within the theoretical model. Section 5 derives some
simple analytical results based on a simpliﬁed version of the model. Section 6 presents the
main numerical analysis of the general model. Section 7 discusses the results and section 8
concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Evidence
In order to put our theoretical model in context we ﬁrst report some basic panel regression
estimates of the relationship between gross positions and inﬂation variability.
We estimate a panel regression of the following form
100 ln() = 0 +  + 1() + 2 (1)
where  is a measure of the size of the gross portfolio position of country  in period
 and () is a measure of inﬂation variability for country  in period ,  is a vector of
other potential explanatory variables and  is a country dummy.
Our main results focus on the total gross position,  , which we deﬁne as
 = (  +   )
2
We also estimate variants of our basic equation where the dependent variable is the gross
position in equity-type assets, and another where the dependent variable is the position in
debt-type assets, where again the gross position is deﬁned as the average of the asset and
liability position in the relevant type of asset.
the robustness of the result across a wide range of model and parameter variations.
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We deﬁne () to be the standard deviation of the CPI inﬂation rate of country  for
the period  −  to  where inﬂation is measured as the annual percentage change in the
CPI measured at quarterly intervals. In the main results we report below we choose  to
be 6 years, so () is the standard deviation of annual inﬂation based on the 24 quarterly
observations of the CPI up to and including the ﬁnal quarter of year .4
Data on gross asset and liability positions is taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
who provide annual data for the period 1970-2007 on gross external positions for 178 countries
for various classes of assets. Our measure of the variability of inﬂation is based on CPI
inﬂation data obtained from the IMF IFS database for the period 1965-2007. The highest
frequency available for all countries is quarterly.
Although the focus of our analysis is on the eﬀects of inﬂation variability on asset holdings,
we include a number of other possible explanatory variables in the above regression. These
are: ﬁnancial frictions, trade openness, exchange rate variability, real output variability and
a linear time trend. Financial frictions, such as regulatory and legal controls on capital
movements, have obvious implications for international portfolio allocation. There have
been major changes in capital controls for many countries over the last 40 years so it is
clearly necessary to control for such eﬀects in our regression. We use the Chinn-Ito index
(Chinn and Ito, 2007) of capital controls as a measure of ﬁnancial frictions. Openness to
trade in goods and services has also increased for many countries over the past 40 years
and this again may be an explanation for the parallel growth in ﬁnancial integration. We
control for this by including the average of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP
as an explanatory variable in our regression. Exchange rate variability is a major factor
determining relative asset returns so changes in exchange rate variability are potentially an
important determinant of portfolio holdings. Exchange rate variability in year  is measured
as the standard deviation of the annual change of the eﬀective nominal exchange rate over
the 6 years up to the end of year . Output variability is a major source of the risk which
motivates the holding of ﬁnancial assets so output variability is potentially an important
determinant of portfolio holdings. Output variability in year  is measured as the standard
deviation of the growth rate of real GDP over the 6 years up to year . Trade and GDP data
is obtained from the IMF IFS database, while eﬀective exchange rate data is obtained from
the BIS.5
4We have estimated variants of our equation where  is equal 5 or 7 years and found results very similar
to those report below.
5The BIS provides monthly data on eﬀective exchange rates for all the countries in our sample. The
standard deviation of the exchange rate for year  is calculated as the standard deviation of the annual
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Before discussing the estimation results it is useful to consider some general features of
the data. The six panels in Figure 1 plot the cross country averages of the data for the G7
countries, while Table 1 shows a cross-country comparison of the data for asset holdings and
inﬂation variability based on individual country averages for each country for two sub-periods
(1970-1989 and 1990-2007). Table 1 also shows the same data for other OECD countries.
Figure 1 and Table 1 show a strong upward trend in the data for gross positions through
the sample period. This upward trend is common to all countries. Figure 1 and Table 1
also show a strong downward trend in inﬂation volatility through the sample. This is also
common to all countries. There are no obvious country outliers in the G7 group of countries
in terms of the general behavior of the data, but the UK, because of its position as a major
ﬁnancial center, tends to have a much larger gross positions than other countries in the G7.
In terms of the other potential explanatory variables for the G7, Figure 1 shows an upward
trend in the Chinn-Ito index and trade integration, a downward trend in output variability
and (after 1980) a downward trend in exchange rate variability.
Regression results relating to equation (1) are reported in Table 2.6 The estimates re-
ported in this table are based on OLS or IV estimation of (1) corrected for autoregression
in the error term.
We begin by focusing on the G7 group of advanced countries. The results for this country
grouping are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. The estimates reported in Column 1
show that inﬂation variability has a negative eﬀect (which is signiﬁcant at the 5% level) on
the size of total gross positions. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the standard deviation
of inﬂation suggests that inﬂation variability has quite a large eﬀect on the size of gross
positions. A coeﬃcient of -3.2 implies that a fall in the standard deviation of annual inﬂation
by 1 percentage point raises  by approximately 3.2%. The average range of the
standard deviation of inﬂation over the sample period is approximately 5 percentage points,
while gross portfolio positions for the G7 reached approximately 200% of GDP by the end
of our sample period. A coeﬃcient of -3.2 on the standard deviation of inﬂation suggests
that gross positions would have been approximately 170% of GDP had inﬂation volatility
remained at the levels seen in the 1970s.
change of the exchange rate measured at monthly intervals over the 72 months ending in the last month of
year . Quarterly GDP data is only available for a very small group of countries for our estimation period
so the standard deviation of GDP is calculated using annual observations of GDP growth. The standard
deviation of GDP in year  is calculated as the standard deviation of the annual growth of GDP measured
at annual intervals over the 6 years up to year .
6To save space, the estimated coeﬃcients on the country dummies are not reported.
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Table 1: Summary of data for G7 and OECD countries
Gross portfolio StDev
% of GDP of Inﬂation
70-89 90-07 70-89 90-07
Canada 50 91 2.02 1.06
France 36 149 2.33 0.58
Germany 35 112 1.51 0.95
Italy 27 83 3.93 0.86
Japan 20 59 3.21 0.93
UK 117 277 3.92 1.44
USA 24 69 2.38 0.83
Australia 25 81 2.66 1.78
Austria 47 134 1.65 0.78
Belgium 100 293 2.37 0.73
Denmark 46 140 2.64 0.65
Finland 31 131 3.15 1.18
Greece 24 68 6.44 2.47
Ireland 86 551 4.25 1.12
Netherlands 79 259 1.87 0.84
Norway 43 109 2.44 1.13
Portugal 126 5.72 1.75
Spain 23 93 3.41 0.96
Sweden 31 147 2.23 1.83
Switzerland 139 375 2.16 1.09
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Table 2: Panel regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
G7 G7 OECD OECD OECD OECD
Total
portfolio
Total
portfolio
Total
portfolio
Total
portfolio
Debt Equities
Constant
-237.8**
(8.31)
-196.9**
(6.95)
-230.9**
(17.26)
-209.2**
(15.16)
-228.8**
(12.8)
-433.3**
(19.5)
StDev
Inﬂation
-3.19**
(3.50)
-2.60**
(3.98)
StDev
Inﬂation (IV)
-11.43**
(3.58)
-9.69**
(3.83)
-4.90*
(1.80)
-18.00**
(4.99)
Chinn-Ito
Index
1.92
(1.02)
-1.73
(0.74)
3.36**
(2.44)
3.06**
(2.16)
3.63**
(2.38)
2.08
(1.04)
StDev
Exch rate
1.16**
(2.22)
0.91*
(1.68)
1.06**
(2.53)
1.22**
(2.85)
1.43**
(3.16)
0.81**
(1.35)
StDev
GDP growth
0.47
(0.32)
-2.87**
(2.00)
1.08
(1.17)
-0.09
(0.10)
1.06
(1.13)
-2.27
(1.58)
Trade
1.98**
(5.28)
1.70**
(4.55)
1.42**
(8.10)
1.36**
(7.64)
1.15**
(6.07)
1.55**
(6.11)
Trend
5.93**
(7.99)
5.86**
(8.90)
6.34**
(16.08)
6.30**
(18.22)
5.28**
(11.37)
10.26**
(18.05)
AR coeﬀ 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.89 0.87
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
F-stat 1845.7 1756.3 2053.1 1956.3 1542.7 1856.2
DW-stat 1.73 1.60 1.75 1.66 1.63 1.79
** indicates signiﬁcant at 5% level, * indicates signiﬁcant at 10% level
t-stats in brackets
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The other coeﬃcient estimates in Column 1 suggest that ﬁnancial openness and the
variability of GDP do not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on gross positions for the
G7 countries but exchange rate variability and trade integration both have a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect. The time trend is also signiﬁcant.7
Of course, while the results in Column 1 suggest that there is statistical relationship
between inﬂation volatility and the size of gross positions, they do not tell us the direction
of causation. One simple way to disentangle causation is to use a measure of central bank
independence as an instrument for inﬂation volatility.8 This approach can be justiﬁed on the
basis that increased central bank independence is an exogenous policy driven process which
has reduced inﬂation volatility over the sample period. Column 2 of Table 2 reports the
results for a variant of the model where we use the Cukierman et al (1992) index of central
bank independence as an instrument.9 The estimated coeﬃcient on inﬂation variability
continues to be negative and signiﬁcant (and is much larger than the coeﬃcient reported
in Column 1). This suggests that there are grounds for supposing that the causation runs
from central bank independence, to lower inﬂation variability and thus to higher gross asset
positions.
In terms of other explanatory variables, the estimated coeﬃcients in column 2 are little
changed compared to column 1, except that the variability of GDP is now signiﬁcant.
Columns 3 to 6 in Table 2 report results for a wider set of OECD economies.10 Column 3
is a direct estimate of equation (1) for this wider set of countries, while column 4 uses central
bank independence as an instrument for inﬂation variability. These two columns show that
extending the analysis to this wider group of countries yields very similar results to those
reported for the G7. The coeﬃcient on inﬂation variability continues to be signiﬁcant and
negative and has a similar absolute size to those reported for the G7.
Columns 5 and 6 report results for debt assets and equity assets respectively for the
group of OECD countries. Compared to Column 4 (which shows the results for total gross
positions), the general pattern of results in these two columns is similar, but the coeﬃcient
7The magnitude of the coeﬃcients in Column 1, together with the evolution of the explanatory variables
observed in the G7 data over the sample period, suggest that the growth in trade integration in the G7 had a
positive eﬀect on gross positions which is slightly larger than the eﬀect of inﬂation variability while the time
trend is the dominant factor accounting for the change in gross positions since the early 1970s. The other
explanatory variables contribute only a very small amount to the overall observed growth in gross positions.
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
9The Cukierman et al (1992) dataset has been up-dated and extended by Crowe and Meade (2007).
10The full list of 20 countries is given in Table 1. This set of countries comprise the membership of the
OECD at the start of our sample period.
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is larger and somewhat more signiﬁcant in the case of equities (Column 6) and smaller and
less signiﬁcant in the case of debt assets (Column 5).
The results reported in Table 2 are not intended to be a comprehensive empirical inves-
tigation of the determinants of gross positions. Nonetheless, they do appear to conﬁrm that
inﬂation variability is a potentially important factor in the expansion of gross positions over
the past four decades.11 The decline in inﬂation variability over the past 40 years appears to
have had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on gross positions which is independent of changes in
other potential explanatory variables such as the decline in ﬁnancial frictions, the increase
in trade integration, ﬂuctuations in exchange rate variability and the decline in output vari-
ability. The eﬀect of inﬂation variability appears to be robust across a range of empirical
speciﬁcations and a range of countries. In the following sections we describe a two-county
general equilibrium model and show that the model’s predictions are consistent with the
above empirical ﬁndings, at least in terms of its qualitative properties for the relationship
between inﬂation variability and gross asset positions.
3 A Model of Monetary Policy and Gross Portfolio
Positions
We analyze a model of two countries with multiple types of shocks. The model shares many
of the same basic features of the closed economy models developed by Christiano et al (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2003). Households in each country consume a basket of non-traded
ﬁnal goods and home and foreign produced traded ﬁnal goods. Final goods are produced
by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms which use intermediate goods as their only input.
Final goods prices are subject to Calvo-style contracts. Intermediate goods are produced by
perfectly competitive ﬁrms using labor and real capital as inputs. Intermediate goods prices
are perfectly ﬂexible. Capital stocks are subject to adjustment costs. Households supply
homogeneous labor to monopolistically competitive labor unions. The labor unions supply
11The signiﬁcance and magnitude of the time trend in all the model variants shown in Table 2 clearly
suggests that there are other explanatory variables which are missing from our regressions. An obvious
candidate for a missing variables would be some measure of communications technology and transactions
costs. The Chinn-Ito index captures the changes in regulatory frameworks over the sample period, but
developments in communications technology and increased competition in the provision of ﬁnancial services
are likely to have had a major impact on international ﬁnancial trade which is independent of regulatory
changes. A more comprehensive empirical investigation of gross positions would have to include some measure
of these factors.
10
diﬀerentiated labor to ﬁrms in the intermediate goods sector. The wages charged by labor
unions are subject to Calvo-style contracts. All proﬁts from ﬁrms in the intermediate and
ﬁnal goods sectors and surpluses from labor unions are paid to households.
We allow trade in equities and bonds. Home and foreign equities represent claims on
aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts of each country, and home and foreign nominal bonds are denominated
in the currency of each country. This roughly gives us a breakdown of gross asset and liability
positions corresponding to the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database.12
The following sections describe the home country in detail. The foreign country is iden-
tical. An asterisk indicates a foreign variable or a price in foreign currency.
3.1 Households
Household  in the home country maximizes a utility function of the form
 = 
∞P
=0

(
1−+ ()
1−  −∆+
1++ ()
1 + 
)
(2)
where   0   0, () is the consumption of household  and  is aggregate consumption,
() is labor supply,  is the discount factor and ∆ is a stochastic preference shock which
aﬀects labor supply. We assume ∆ = ∆¯ exp(∆ˆ) where ∆ˆ = ∆∆ˆ−1 + ∆ where, 0 
∆  1 and ∆ is a zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d. shock with  [∆] = 2∆.
 as a consumption aggregator deﬁned across traded and non-traded goods, given by
 =
h
 1κ 
κ−1
κ
 + (1− )
1
κ 
κ−1
κ

i κκ−1
(3)
where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and κ  0 is the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded
goods.  is an aggregator deﬁned across all individual non-traded goods and  is an
aggregator deﬁned across home and foreign goods, given by:
 =
h
 1
−1

 + (1− )
1
 
−1


i 
−1
(4)
where  and  are aggregators over individual home and foreign produced goods. The
elasticity of substitution across individual goods within all sectors is   1. The parameter 
12We restrict attention to nominal bonds in each currency. While the inclusion of inﬂation linked bonds in
the menu of assets would certainly raise a number of interesting theoretical issues, from an empirical point
of view such bonds still form a relatively small share of portfolio holdings in the relevant data period. For
instance, the UK and US governments are to date the two biggest issuers of index-linked debt. The UK
started issuing index-linked bonds in 1981 and the outstanding stock is still less than 25% of UK GDP, while
the US government started issuing index-linked bonds in 1997 and the outstanding stock is less than 5% of
US GDP. These amounts are very small in relation to the total size of international gross asset positions.
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in (4) is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded goods. The parameter
 measures the importance of consumption of the home good in preferences over traded
goods. For   12, we have ‘home bias’ in preferences. Given this speciﬁcation, the
aggregate CPI for home households is therefore
 =
h
 (1−κ) + (1− )
(1−κ)

i 1
1−κ
(5)
where  and  are the aggregate price indices for traded and non-traded goods where 
is given by
 =
£
 1− + (1− ) 1−
¤ 1
1− (6)
where  is the aggregate price index of home traded goods for home consumers and 
is the aggregate price index of foreign traded goods for home consumers. The corresponding
prices for foreign consumers are  and  
The ﬂow budget constraint of the home country household is
 +  =  + Π + Θ −  + 
P
=1
−1 (7)
where  denotes home country net external assets in terms of the home consumption basket,
 is the home nominal wage, Π represents real proﬁts of all home ﬁrms, (deﬁned further
below), Θ is the surplus of labor unions (again deﬁned below) and  is lump-sum taxes
imposed on households. The ﬁnal term represents the total return on the home country
portfolio where −1 represents the real external holdings of asset  (deﬁned in terms of
home country consumption, purchased at the end of period − 1 for holding into period )
and  represents the gross real return on asset . We allow for trade in up to  = 4
assets; home and foreign equity, as well as home and foreign nominal bonds.13
Nominal bonds are assumed to be perpetuities, so for instance, home nominal bonds
represent a claim on a unit of home currency in each period into the inﬁnite future. The
real price of the home bond is denoted  The gross real rate of return on a home bond is
thus +1 = (1+1++1) For the foreign nominal bond, the real return on foreign
bonds, in terms of home consumption, is ∗+1 = (+1)(1 ∗+1 + ∗+1)∗, where
 =  ∗  is the real exchange rate of the home economy.
Home equities represent a claim on home aggregate proﬁts of all ﬁrms in the home traded,
non-traded , ﬁnal and intermediate sectors. The real payoﬀ to a unit of the home equity
purchased in period  is deﬁned to be Π+1 + +1, where +1 is the real price of home
13Note that  is deﬁned as  =
P
=1 .
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equity and Π+1 is real aggregate proﬁts. Thus the gross real rate of return on the home
equity is +1 = (Π+1 + +1).
Without loss of generality, we let the foreign nominal bond act as the th asset, so that
+1 = ∗+1.
Optimal portfolio choices imply
−+1(+1 − +1) = 0  = 1 − 1 (8)
The portfolio selection equation for the foreign agent must take account of the fact that real
exchange rate changes alter the optimal relationship between marginal utility and excess
returns, so that
∗−+1
(+1 − +1)
+1
= 0  = 1 − 1 (9)
3.2 Government
Total government expenditure is assumed to be exogenous and subject to stochastic shocks.
In particular we assume that  = ¯ exp(ˆ) where ˆ = ˆ−1+  where, 0    1
and  is a zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d. shock with  [] = 2.  is assumed to
be allocated between non-traded and home traded goods in ﬁxed proportions  and 1− The
allocation of government expenditure across individual goods within each sector is governed
by an aggregators similar to that of consumers.
All government spending is ﬁnanced via lump sum taxes on households,  and ﬁrms,
  The budget constraint is  =  +  where it is assumed that  =
(1 − ) and  =  where  is a ﬁxed parameter which determines the share
of proﬁt taxes in the overall tax take.  is the price index of government purchased goods
and is given by  =  + (1− )
3.3 The Labor Market
Labor unions are introduced as a convenient modeling device to allow for nominal wage
stickiness.
Labor unions hire homogeneous labor from households in a perfectly competitive primary
labor market at wage rate  They act as monopolistic competitors in a secondary labor
market where they sell diﬀerentiated labor to intermediate goods ﬁrms. Labor union 
charges () in the secondary market and faces demand for its variety of labor as follows
() = 
µ()

¶−
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where  is aggregate demand for labor and is the aggregate wage in the secondary labor
market and  is the elasticity of substitution between labor varieties.
The choice of () is subject to Calvo-style sticky-wage contracts with partial backward
indexation. In each period () can be optimally reset with probability 1 −  or partially
indexed to past aggregate wage inﬂation with probability  where the degree of indexation
is given by  (where 0 ≤  ≤ 1).
Labor union  chooses () to maximize

∞P
=0
Ω+
∙
+()
()
+
− +()
+
+
¸
where Ω is the stochastic discount factor of home households. The aggregate surplus of
labor unions (which is paid to households) is given by Θ =  ( − ) 
3.4 Firms
Within each country there is a traded and non-traded sector and within each of these sectors
ﬁrms are divided between ﬁnal and intermediate sectors. Intermediate goods ﬁrms use labor
and ﬁxed capital. Labor is fully mobile between sectors but capital is immobile. The
structure of the intermediate sector is similar in the traded and non-traded sectors so the
equations shown below apply to both traded and non-traded sectors. Variables for the traded
and non-traded sectors are indicated with subscripts  and  .
There is a unit mass of ﬁrms in each of the non-traded and traded sectors at both the
ﬁnal and intermediate levels.
3.4.1 Final goods
Each ﬁrm in the ﬁnal goods sector of sector  produces a single diﬀerentiated product. Sticky
prices are modeled in the form of Calvo-style contracts with a probability of re-setting price
given by 1 −  and partial backward indexation with the degree of indexation given by 
(where 0 ≤  ≤ 1). We consider both producer currency pricing (PCP) and local currency
pricing (LCP).
If ﬁrms use the discount factor Ω to evaluate future proﬁts, then, in the PCP case, ﬁrm
 in the traded sector chooses its prices for home and foreign buyers, () and ()
in home currency to maximize

∞P
=0
Ω+
½
+()
[()− +]
+
+ +()
[()− +]
+
¾
(10)
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where () is the demand for home traded good  from home buyers and  () is the
demand for home good  from foreign buyers and  is the price of the intermediate good
in the traded goods sector.
In the LCP case ﬁrm  chooses () in home currency and ∗() in foreign currency
to maximize (10) where () is replaced by ∗()+ where  is the price of the foreign
currency in terms of the home currency.
In the non-traded sector ﬁrm  chooses () to maximize

∞P
=0
Ω++()
[()− +]
+
(11)
where () is the demand for non-traded good  and  is the price of the intermediate
good in the non-traded goods sector.
Monopoly power in the ﬁnal goods sector implies that ﬁnal goods prices are subject to
a mark-up given by  = ( − 1) The mark-up is assumed to be subject to stochastic
shocks such that  = ¯ exp(ˆ) where ˆ = ˆ−1 +  where, 0    1 and  is a
zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d. shock with  [] = 2.
3.4.2 Intermediate goods
The representative ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector  (where  =  ) combines labor,
, and capital, , to produce output  using a standard Cobb-Douglas technology,  =
(−1)1− where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is capacity utilization,  is an index deﬁned across
all individual varieties of labor supplied by labor unions and  = exp(ˆ) is a common
stochastic productivity shock across all intermediate goods ﬁrms in sector  Productivity
shocks follow a joint process of the form
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ˆ
ˆ∗
ˆ
ˆ∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= 
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ˆ−1
ˆ∗−1
ˆ−1
ˆ∗−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+  (12)
where  is a vector of zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d. shocks with variance-covariance
matrix Σ.
The capital accumulation equation in sector  is
+1 =  + (1− )
where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is the rate of depreciation. Capital is subject to adjustment costs given by
( − ¯)2
2¯
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where   0 and ¯ is the steady state level of investment in sector .  is a stochastic shock to
investment costs which is common to both traded and non-traded sectors, where  = exp(ˆ)
and ˆ = ˆ−1 +  where, 0    1 and  is a zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d.
shock with  [] = 2 . Capital has the same composition as consumption (see equations
(3) and (4)) so the price of investment goods is given by (5).
Firms are assumed to incur costs of unused capacity which are given by the following
z(+ − 1)2
2
where z ≥ 014
The representative ﬁrm in sector  chooses ,  and  to maximize the real dis-
counted value of dividends, given by

∞P
=0
Ω+Υ+
∙+
+
+ −
+
+
+ − + −
(++ − ¯)2
2¯
− z(+ − 1)
2
2
¸
subject to the production function and capital accumulation equations where  is the price
of intermediate goods in sector . Ω is the stochastic discount factor of shareholders of the
ﬁrm. Υ is a shock which aﬀects the cost of funds to ﬁrms. Smets and Wouters (2003) refer
to this as a risk premium shock and suggest that it captures the eﬀects of variations in the
external ﬁnance premium. We assume that Υ = exp(Υˆ) and Υˆ = ΥΥˆ−1 + Υ where,
0  Υ  1
3.4.3 Aggregate output and employment
Total private sector expenditure is
 =  +  +  +
( − ¯)2
2¯
+
( − ¯ )2
2¯
+
z(+ − 1)2
2
(13)
so home purchases of home non-traded and home traded ﬁnal goods are
 = 
µ

¶−
 (14)
 = (1− )
µ

¶− µ

¶−
 (15)
14Christiano et al (2005) argue that variable capital utilization is important in explaining the apparent
degree of price inertia. Variable capital utilization implies that the marginal cost of capital tends to be less
variable over the cycle and thus output prices are less variable. Variable capital utilization is also a feature
of the Smets and Wouters (2003). If capital utilization is assumed to be ﬁxed (i.e.  = 1) all the qualitative
results reported below are unaﬀected. The only eﬀect is that the size of gross positions is somewhat less
sensitive to the degree of inﬂation variability.
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Using the properties of demand curves, we can deﬁne equilibrium in the market for good 
in the home country non-traded ﬁnal goods sector as
() =
µ()

¶−
[ + ]
So aggregate demand for the non-traded intermediate good is
 =
1R
0
() =  [ + ]
where  =
1R
0
³
()

´−

Each home country ﬁrm in the traded ﬁnal goods sector faces demand for its good from
home consumers and foreign consumers. Again, using the properties of demand curves, we
can deﬁne equilibrium in the market for good  in the home country traded ﬁnal goods sector
as
() = () + ()
where
() =
µ()

¶−
[ + (1− )] () =
Ã
∗()
 ∗
!−
∗ (16)
where ∗ is the foreign country demand for home traded goods (which is deﬁned analo-
gously to (15)). So aggregate demand for the home traded intermediate good is therefore
 =
1R
0
() +
1R
0
() =  [ + (1− )] + ∗
where  =
1R
0
³
()

´−
 and  =
1R
0
³∗()
∗
´−

Aggregate GDP for the home economy is given by
 =


[ + ] +


[ + (1− )] +
 ∗

∗
where  is the GDP deﬂator, which we deﬁne as follows
 =  + (1− )[(1− ) + ] + (1− )(1− )(1− ) ∗
where  is the steady-state share of government spending in GDP.
Demand for labor variety  is given by
() =
µ()

¶−
[ + ]
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Aggregating across all varieties of labor yields the aggregate demand for labor in the primary
labor market as follows
 =  −1
1R
0
() =  + 
where  =
1R
0
³
()

´−
 Equilibrium in the primary labor market implies  = 
Total after-tax dividends aggregated across all intermediate and ﬁnal goods ﬁrms in both
traded and non-traded sectors are given by
Π =


 −


 −  − 
−( − ¯)
2
2¯
− ( − ¯ )
2
2¯
− z(+ − 1)
2
2
− z(+ − 1)
2
2
− 
Home equities represent claims on Π (into the inﬁnite future).
3.5 Monetary Authorities
Monetary authorities follow a policy that targets the path of,  the nominal rate of return
on the nominal bonds of their respective currencies. We assume that the target for  is
governed by a Taylor rule. For the home country, this is described by
 = 
1
−1 −1
"µ 
−1
¶µ
˜
¶
exp()
#1−
(17)
where 0    1,   1, and   0, and ˜ represents potential output of the home coun-
try.  is a random monetary policy disturbance which is zero-mean, i.i.d. and normally
distributed with  [] = 2.
Note that the rule (17) determines the nominal interest rate as a function of the historic
CPI inﬂation rate. We choose the CPI inﬂation rate because this represents a better
description of the actual practice in countries that have been explicitly following inﬂation
targeting policies. More generally, even outside of the explicit inﬂation targeters, the CPI is
by far the most visible and relevant price index for guiding monetary policy. Finally, while
our focus is not on optimal policy, in the presence of local currency pricing, it has been
established that targeting CPI inﬂation may be preferable to PPI inﬂation targeting (Engel,
2011).
We will assume that potential output, ˜ is constant. This assumption would not be
justiﬁed if we were modeling the optimal choice of policy rule since shocks to productivity and
preferences clearly change the welfare relevant measure of potential output. As our purpose
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is to represent actual rather than optimal monetary policymaking, we ignore the impact
of shocks on ˜ In practice policymakers are not able directly to observe shocks aﬀecting
potential output and therefore tend to measure potential output using a moving average
measure of actual output. This tends not to change much in the short run in response to
shocks.
While we argue that rule in the form of (17) which depends on CPI inﬂation and the
output gap measured relative to a fairly static measure of capacity output is a reasonable
empirical representation of actual monetary policy, we do consider alternative forms of mon-
etary rule in our numerical analysis of the model.
Rule (17) allows for a degree of partial adjustment in monetary policy, which is deter-
mined by the parameter 
The feedback parameter on inﬂation,  will be a key parameter in the analysis which
follows. A higher value of  implies that monetary policy is more focused on inﬂation
stabilization. In equilibrium this will result in lower variability of inﬂation. The central
issue we will investigate is the relationship between  and the size of equilibrium gross
holdings of equities and bonds.
4 Portfolio Choice
Our main interest is in the characteristics of the portfolio positions, and their relationship
to the stance of monetary policy. In this vein, we follow Devereux and Sutherland (2011a)
in computing the characteristics of the portfolios using a second order approximation to the
portfolio selection equations for the home and foreign country (8) and (9), in conjunction
with a ﬁrst order approximation to the home and foreign budget constraints and the vector
of excess returns.
The Devereux and Sutherland (2011a) approach allows us to derive reduced-form solu-
tions for gross portfolio holdings of equities and bonds. In order to interpret these solutions
we now derive some useful expressions which show how portfolio holdings are related in
equilibrium to the second moments of income and asset returns. These expressions are not
reduced-form solutions in the sense that the second moments of income and asset returns
themselves depend on portfolio holdings. They do however highlight some of the underlying
intuition for the link between inﬂation variability and gross portfolio positions.
In all the cases we analyze below the home and foreign economies are entirely symmetric.
If it is assumed that assets 1 and 2 are respectively home and foreign equities then it follows
that 1 = −2 in equilibrium. Likewise, if assets 3 and 4 are home and foreign bonds
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then in equilibrium it follows that 3 = −4 It is useful to deﬁne  = −1 = 2 and
 = −3 = 4 Thus  is a measure of the gross external position in equities and  is a
measure of the gross external position in bonds, where “gross external position” is deﬁned
to be the position that one country holds in the assets issued by the other country. It is also
useful to deﬁne  =  − ∗ to be the return on home equities relative to the return on
foreign equities and  =  − ∗ to be the return on home bonds relative to the return on
foreign bonds.
Following Devereux and Sutherland (2011a) we obtain the condition

µ
+1 − ∗+1 −
1
+1
¶
+1 = 0 (18)
where  = −¯¯ , except for  which is deﬁned as  = [ ]0
Note that using the deﬁnitions of , Π and Θ and the government budget constraint
we may write the home country budget constraint as
 +  =  + 
P
=1
−1
where
 =  −


 −


 −


( − ¯)2
2¯
− 
( − ¯ )2
2¯
− 

is home output net of investment and government expenditure.  can be thought of as
the resources available for household consumption expenditure, i.e. household disposable
income.
Taking a ﬁrst order approximation around the initial point where  = 0, we obtain
¯ +  = ¯ + ¯ − ¯ + −1−1 + e0 (19)
where ¯ is steady state consumption relative to GDP and  is measured in terms of level
deviations from the steady state (of zero), relative to steady state GDP and e = [    ]0 =
[˜ ˜]0 represents the zero order (or steady state) portfolio, relative to steady state GDP.15
Using the equivalent condition for the foreign country, and leading by one period, we
arrive at the condition
¯
µ
∆+1 −
1
+1
¶
= ¯∆+1 + ¯
(− 1)
 +1 + 
−12 − 2+1 + 2e0+1 (20)
15To simplify notation in this expression (and those which follow) we omit the residual of approximation.
Note that, unlike in Devereux and Sutherland (2011a) where shock processes are assumed to have ﬁnite
support, the shock processes in this model are normally distributed. This implies that the appropriate
interpretation of the order of approximation is in terms of “order in probability”.
20
where ∆ = − ∗ ∆ =  − ∗ − ∗ − +  . Now iterating forward on (20), using the
appropriate transversality constraint, gives
¯+1
∞X
=0

µ
∆+1+ −
1
+1+
¶
= ¯+1
∞X
=0

∙
∆+1+ +
(− 1)
 +1+
¸
+−12 + 2e0+1 (21)
From the Euler equations for consumption growth for the home and foreign country we
have
∆+1 = ∆ +
+1 − 
 (22)
Now, using (21) with (22) we arrive at the expression for real exchange rate adjusted relative
consumption in period + 1 as
¯
µ
∆+1 −
1
+1
¶
= (1− )
£
Γ+1 + −12 + 2e0+1¤ (23)
where
Γ+1 = ¯+1
∞X
=0

µ
∆+1+ +
(− 1)
 +1+
¶
represents the present value of expected innovations to relative disposable income, plus the
present value of expected innovations to the real exchange rate. Note that in the case of
 = 1, the second term drops out, and innovations in current and expected future real
exchange rates do not directly aﬀect the value of ∆+1 − 1+1.
Putting (23) together with the orthogonality condition (18), we may compute the ex-
pressions characterizing the equilibrium portfolio as
˜ = 1
2
Σ−1 cov(+1 +1) (24)
where +1 = Γ+1 − Γ+1 and where Σ is the co-variance matrix of +1 − +1.
Thus, the optimal portfolio position is determined by the way in which innovations in the
excess return vector co-vary with innovations in the expected present discounted value of
relative income (adjusted by the real exchange rate). Note that expression (24) is not a
reduced form because the second moments on the right-hand side depend on ˜
The Appendix shows that equation (24) is equivalent to the following expressions for
equilibrium asset holdings
˜ =
1
2
corr
¡
 |
¢ StDev ¡|¢
StDev
¡
|
¢ (25)
˜ =
1
2
corr
¡
 |
¢ StDev ¡|¢
StDev
¡
|
¢ (26)
These expressions show that the size of the gross position in asset  depends on two factors:
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1 corr
¡
 |
¢
 the correlation of the return diﬀerential of asset  with innovations in
the present value of relative disposable income (conditional on the return diﬀerential
of asset )
2 StDev
¡
|
¢
StDev
¡
|
¢
 the standard deviation of innovations in the present
value of relative disposable income (conditional on the return diﬀerential of asset )
relative to the standard deviations of returns on asset  (conditional on the return
diﬀerential of asset )
Again note that we use the Devereux and Sutherland (2011a) approach to derive solutions for
equilibrium portfolios and we use (25) and (26) only as a useful means to analyze the depen-
dence of equilibrium portfolios on monetary policy and inﬂation variability. The expressions
(25) and (26) can not themselves be used to calculate equilibrium portfolios because the
second moments on the right-hand side depend on ˜16 Note also that these two expressions
hold regardless of the completeness of international ﬁnancial markets. Our model in its most
general form contains more sources of shocks than there are independent assets. Full risk
sharing is therefore not possible. Equations (25) and (26) can nevertheless be used to analyze
equilibrium portfolio holdings.
Expressions (25) and (26) will prove useful in interpreting the impact of inﬂation vari-
ability on portfolio positions. These expressions have a very intuitive explanation. Agents
wish to hold a portfolio of assets which hedge against shocks to relative disposable income,
 The extent to which asset  provides a good hedge against relative disposable income
shocks depends on the correlation between the return on asset  and relative disposable
income shocks, i.e. corr
¡
 |
¢
 An asset which is (negatively) correlated with dis-
posable income shocks is a good hedging instrument and so will be held in the equilibrium
portfolio with a positive gross position. The stronger the correlation the more of that asset
16In principle the behavior of both excess returns and relative income depend on portfolio holdings. In
any given model it is possible to analyze the degree and nature of this dependence by solving the model for
an exogenously ﬁxed portfolio and investigating the eﬀect of variations in that portfolio on asset returns and
income diﬀerences. In the current model it appears that portfolio holdings have their most signiﬁcant eﬀect on
income diﬀerences. For instance, a shift from zero portfolio holdings to optimal equilibrium portfolio holdings
appears to reduce the volatility of income diﬀerences. This appears to be because the equilibrium portfolio
reduces consumption diﬀerences (because it improves risk sharing), which tends to reduce ﬂuctuations in
relative goods demand across countries. This helps to stabilize output and income. The net result is that
the general equilibrium portfolio implies smaller (in absolute size) gross portfolio holdings than would be
predicted by (25) and (26) if the moments on the right hand side of these expressions were calculated on the
basis of a zero portfolio equilibrium.
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will be held. But the amount of the asset that needs to be held to hedge income shocks also
depends on the size of ﬂuctuations in disposable income relative to the size of ﬂuctuations
in the return on asset , i.e. StDev
¡
|
¢
StDev
¡
|
¢
 The larger are ﬂuctuations
in disposable income relative to ﬂuctuations in the return on asset  the larger must be the
gross position in asset  in order to provide the desired degree of hedging.
These two eﬀects, (i.e. the correlation eﬀect measured by corr¡ |¢  and the
volatility eﬀect measured by StDev¡|¢ StDev¡|¢) will prove useful in interpret-
ing the link between inﬂation variability and the size of gross positions.17
5 Monetary Policy and Gross Portfolios: A Simple Ex-
ample
In the quantitative analysis below we show that gross portfolio positions are sensitive to
monetary policy, and in particular that a tighter monetary policy rule - associated with
a higher value of  (the feedback coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule) - leads to an
expansion of gross bond and equity positions. Here, we develop a special case to demonstrate
the intuition for this result. To do this, we examine a drastically simpliﬁed version of the
above model.
In this case, rather than Calvo-style price and wage setting, we assume that nominal
wages are perfectly ﬂexible and that all ﬁnal goods prices are re-set period by period with
fraction  of ﬁrms setting prices in each period in advance of shocks being realized for that
period and fraction (1 − ) setting prices after shocks have been realized. We also assume
that there is no non-traded goods sector ( = 0) and no home bias in preferences over traded
goods ( = 12), no government spending and that utility is linear in work eﬀort, i.e.  = 0.
We further assume that the production function is linear in labor input, i.e.  = 1 (so real
17van Wincoop and Warnock (2010) use an expression very simpler to (25) and (26) to analyze the links
between home bias in goods markets and home bias in equity holdings. The speciﬁc question they address
is whether equilibrium equity holdings reﬂect a desire to hedge real exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Notice that
exactly this hedging motive enters (25) and (26) via the deﬁnition of  van Wincoop and Warnock show
that data on covariances between real exchange rates and excess asset returns do not support the proposition
that equity home bias arises because of a desire to hedge real exchange rate risks. Notice however that,
while this result casts doubt on the role of real exchange rate hedging in generating equity home bias, it
does not necessarily imply that expressions such as (25) and (26) are empirically invalid. Real exchange rate
ﬂuctuations are only one of the risks faced by households. Overall portfolio holdings are (in theory) designed
to hedge all risks and a full empirical test of (25) and (26) would require data on the covariance between
excess returns and an empirical measure of  This is certainly an interesting topic for further research.
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capital and investment are zero). We simplify the monetary policy rule by assuming that
there is no inertia in interest rate setting, i.e.  = 0. Finally, we assume that there are
shocks only to productivity and that these shocks are i.i.d. (i.e.  = 0). For transparency,
we assume that there are only relative shocks, so that ˆ∗ = −ˆ .18
With only one source of stochastic shocks, perfect risk sharing can be achieved with just
two assets. We therefore consider separately the case where there are two equities (home
and foreign) and two nominal bonds (denominated in home and foreign currency).
Using the assumptions just stated, we may derive an expression for the present value of
innovations in expected relative home income, , as follows
 =
()( − 1)(1− )
 +  2ˆ (27)
Thus a shock to home productivity (relative to foreign productivity) raises the expected
present value of relative home income, for   1 This expression holds for both the equities-
only and bonds-only cases.
5.1 Equities only
Again, using the assumptions speciﬁc to this example, we can establish that the excess return
on home equity relative to foreign equity is
 = (1− )
(− 1) + ()[ − 1 + (− )]
 +  2ˆ (28)
Thus a shock to home productivity (relative to foreign productivity) raises the excess relative
return on home equity (assuming   1).
Since markets are complete in this example, households can fully insure against shocks
by holding a portfolio of home and foreign equities. By deﬁnition, the full insurance portfolio
has a payoﬀ which perfectly oﬀsets innovations to expected relative home income, . The
optimal portfolio must therefore satisfy
˜ = −
18The eﬀect of many of these simplifying assumptions is to shut down most of the dynamic elements of
the model and therefore most of the sources of real inertia. This tends to amplify the short run eﬀect of
shocks on the endogenous variables of the model and emphasizes the role of monetary policy. The net result
is to make portfolio holdings very sensitive to variations in the parameters of the monetary policy rule. The
results reported in this section therefore tend to exaggerate the quantitative signiﬁcance of the link between
inﬂation variability and the size of portfolio holdings. It will become apparent below that, in the general
model, once all the dynamic elements of the model are re-introduced, portfolio holdings tend to be less
sensitive to the stance of monetary policy.
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Using this condition and the expressions for  and  given in (27) and (28) the equity
portfolio is
˜ =
1
2
1
(1− )
()( − 1)(1− )
(− 1) + ()[ − 1 + (− )] (29)
Thus the home country takes a long position in foreign equity, ˜  0 (assuming   1 and
  ).19
The key feature of (29) is that gross holdings of equities depend on the parameters of the
monetary rule. It is simple to show that (provided   ) as the weight on CPI inﬂation in
the monetary rule rises (i.e. as  rises), the size of the gross equity position rises.
Further insight into the underlying determinants of gross positions can be gained by
considering the expressions for asset positions stated in (25) and (26). For the equities-only
case in the current model the following expressions can be derived (assuming   1)
StDev
¡

¢
=
()( − 1)(1− )
 +  2
corr
¡
 
¢
= 1
StDev
¡

¢
= (1− )(− 1) + ()[ − 1 + (− )] +  2
where 2 is the variance of productivity shocks. Note that these expressions are for uncon-
ditional moments since there is only one type of asset traded.
These expressions show that  aﬀects portfolio holdings through its impact on the stan-
dard deviation of  and . More speciﬁcally, it can be shown that, as  rises, StDev
¡

¢
increases and StDev
¡

¢
decreases.
The link between inﬂation variability and the standard deviation of relative income,
StDev
¡

¢
, can be explained as follows. The presence of sticky nominal prices implies that,
as monetary authorities adopt a monetary stance which is focused on inﬂation stabilizing,
the volatility of real output increases. This translates into more volatility in relative income,
as indicated by the behavior of StDev
¡

¢
.
The impact of inﬂation variability on equity returns can also be explained in simple
economic terms. Sticky nominal prices imply that proﬁt margins are aﬀected by variability
in nominal marginal costs. A reduction in the volatility of CPI inﬂation tends to reduce the
variability of nominal marginal costs and thus tends to stabilize proﬁts and equity returns.
19Recall that e measures the gross external position in equities, where the “gross external position” is
deﬁned to be the position that one country holds in the equities issued by the other country. It is reasonable
to assume that the elasticity of substitution between goods for sale within a country () is higher than the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign hoods ()
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This, combined with the eﬀect of inﬂation stabilization on StDev¡¢ implies that the size
of gross equity holdings increase as  is increased.
This simple example illustrates how the volatility eﬀect (which operates via the impact
of inﬂation variability on StDev
¡

¢
StDev
¡

¢
) links inﬂation variability to the size of
gross positions. Note that the correlation eﬀect (which operates via corr¡ ¢) does not
arise in this example because, in a complete markets case, this correlation is equal to unity
regardless of the parameters of the monetary policy rule.
5.2 Bonds only
Now consider the case where ﬁnancial trade is restricted to home and foreign bonds. Using
the assumptions outlined above for this special case the excess return on home bonds relative
to foreign bonds is
 =
(1− )
 + 2ˆ (30)
Given the form of the monetary rule (17), a productivity shock leads to a rise in the home
nominal interest rate, which causes an appreciation of the home currency, so there is a
positive excess return on home bonds relative to foreign bonds.
In the bonds-only case the optimal bond portfolio must satisfy
˜ = −
so
˜ =
1
2
()( − 1)
 (31)
Thus the home country takes a long position in foreign bonds, ˜  0 (assuming   1).20
Again, the key feature of (31) is that gross holdings depend on the parameters of the
monetary rule. As the weight on CPI inﬂation in the monetary rule,  rises, the absolute
size of the gross bond position rises.
As in the equities-only case, further insight into the underlying determinants of gross
positions can be gained by considering the expressions for asset positions stated in (25) and
(26). For the bonds-only case the following expression can be derived (assuming   1)
StDev
¡

¢
=
()( − 1)(1− )
 +  2
corr
¡
 
¢
= 1
20Again, recall that e measures gross external position in bonds, where the “gross external position” is
deﬁned to be the position that one country holds in the bonds issued by the other country.
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StDev
¡

¢
=
(1− )
 + 2
These expressions show that the standard deviation of  increases, and the standard devi-
ation of  decreases, as  increases.
The underlying economic explanation for the link between inﬂation variability and the
variability of relative income is identical to the equities-only case, i.e. the presence of sticky
nominal prices implies that, as monetary authorities adopt a monetary stance which is
focused on inﬂation stabilizing, the volatility of real output increases. This translates into
more volatility in relative income, as indicated by the behavior of StDev
¡

¢
.
The link between  and the variability of relative bond returns is also easily understood.
The nominal return on nominal bonds is ﬁxed by assumption.21 Unanticipated shocks which
aﬀect CPI inﬂation therefore directly impact on the real return on nominal bonds. A mon-
etary policy stance which stabilizes inﬂation must by deﬁnition stabilize the real return on
nominal bonds. This is the eﬀect captured by the above expression for StDev¡¢ 
In the case of bond holdings the variability of relative income increases and the variability
of bond returns decreases as  is increased. Both these eﬀects contribute to the increase in
the absolute size of gross bond holdings. This is again an example of the return volatility
eﬀect. Again note that the correlation eﬀect (which operates via corr¡ ¢) does not
arise in this example because, as before, when markets are complete, this correlation is equal
to unity regardless of the parameters of the monetary policy rule.
6 Monetary Policy and Gross Portfolios: The General
Case
The simple example model discussed above shows that, in the presence of sticky nominal
prices, a monetary policy which stabilizes inﬂation tends to reduce the variability of real
asset returns. This implies that gross portfolio positions in equities and bonds increase as
inﬂation is stabilized.
We now turn to the general model (with Calvo price setting, real capital, traded and
non-traded goods and a range of shocks) and show that this basic result continues to hold.
We show that the underlying intuition for the basic result remains true, i.e. a reduction in
inﬂation volatility tends to reduce the variability of asset returns, which tends to increase
21Nominal returns vary from period to period, but at the time portfolio allocations are made the nominal
returns on bonds between the current period and the following period are known with certainty.
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equilibrium gross positions in equities and bonds. We also demonstrate however, that when
markets are incomplete, the correlation eﬀect comes into play and can reinforce the negative
relationship between inﬂation variability and the size of gross positions.
The general model is too complex to analyze explicitly so we focus on numerical simula-
tions for plausible parameter values.
6.1 Benchmark parameter values
The benchmark parameter values used in the following analysis are listed in Table 3.
The discount factor,  is chosen to yield a steady state rate of return of approximately
4%. The rate of depreciation of real capital,  is set at 0.025 (implying an annual rate of
depreciation of 10%) and the value of the capital adjustment cost,  is chosen to yield a
variance of total investment which is approximately 3 times the variance of GDP (which
is consistent with the data for most developed economies). The capacity utilization cost
parameter, z is set at 02, which is consistent with the value estimated by Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007).
The value of  the elasticity between home and foreign traded goods, is consistent with
the benchmark parameterization of Backus et al (1994). The share of non-traded goods
in the consumption basket,  the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded
goods, κ and the share of home traded goods in the traded consumption basket,  are
based on an approximate average of values used in Benigno and Thoenissen (2008), Corsetti
et al (2008) and Stockman and Tesar (1995). In the case of  the value is chosen to imply
a steady state share of external trade of approximately 20% (taking account of the assumed
home-bias in the composition of government spending).
The values of  (the elasticity of substitution between individual ﬁnal goods) and  (the
Cobb-Douglas coeﬃcient on labor in the production function of intermediate goods) are
chosen to yield a steady state monopoly markup of 11% and share of capital in output of
033. The implied steady state share of dividends in GDP is approximately 015.
The Calvo parameters for price and wage setting,  and  are chosen to imply an average
period between price or wage changes of 4 quarters. The degree of backward indexation in
price and wage setting,  and  and the values of  (labor elasticity) and  (risk aversion)
are consistent with the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007).
The values of the Taylor rule parameters  and  are broadly consistent with the estimates
of, for example, Clarida et al (1998, 2000) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007).22
22Note that the value of  is adjusted to take account of the diﬀerence between annual and quarterly
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The steady state share of government spending in GDP, , is set at 0.2 and the share
of dividend taxes in total taxes,   is set at 0.15 (which is approximately the same as the
assumed steady state share of dividends in total income).
The co-variance matrix of innovations of productivity shocks, Σ and the degree of
persistence in productivity shocks, , are chosen to be approximately the average of the
estimated values reported by Benigno and Thoenissen (2008), Corsetti et al (2008) and
Stockman and Tesar (1995) (with adjustments made to allow for the diﬀerence between
annual and quarterly series). The parameters of the other shock processes are approximately
based on the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007).
Results are reported for a range of variations around the benchmark parameterization.
6.2 Gross portfolios in the benchmark case
We consider two versions of the benchmark parameterization, one with producer currency
pricing (PCP) and one with local currency pricing (LCP). We ﬁrst consider the PCP case.
The eﬀect of varying the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule,  on equilibrium portfolio
holdings of equities and bonds in the PCP case is illustrated in Figure 2. Panels (a) and
(b) plot the equilibrium holdings of foreign equities and bonds by the home country for a
range of values of  These ﬁgures show that the external positions in foreign equities and
foreign bonds by the home country are positive and rising in  (except, in the case of equity
holdings, at very low values of  ) In other words the size of gross positions increase as
monetary policy becomes more focused on inﬂation stabilization.23 For reference, panel (i)
shows the eﬀect of varying the inﬂation feedback parameter on the variability of inﬂation.
This ﬁgure shows that inﬂation variability declines as  is increased.24
measures of the nominal interest rate and rate of inﬂation.
23The portfolio positions shown in these plots show external asset holdings relative to GDP. It is apparent
that the model is predicting large gross positions in equities. Portfolio positions in equities of this magnitude
are not realistic (for most countries) so the model is clearly not a good match for the data in this respect.
The model, however, assumes that international asset trade is costless and unhindered by capital controls or
other market frictions. Tille and van Wincoop (2010) show that it is straightforward to incorporate small
transactions costs into a portfolio choice problem of the type analyzed here. If such costs were introduced
into the current model it is likely equilibrium gross portfolios would be reduced to more realistic levels.
24Note that panels (a) and (b) are showing the holdings of foreign equity and bonds by the home country.
Bond holdings are positive, implying the home country is long in foreign currency bonds. This is a symmetric
equilibrium, so the home country is simultaneously short in home currency bonds. Lane and Shambaugh
(2010) show that this pattern of bond holdings corresponds to the pattern observed for many developed
countries (i.e. these countries tend to be long in foreign currency bonds and short in own-currency bonds).
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Table 3: Benchmark Parameter Values
Discount factor  = 099
Elasticity of substitution between individual goods  = 10
Elasticity of labor supply 1 = 067
Risk aversion  = 15
Average share of home goods in consumption basket  = 058
Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods  = 15
Share of labor in production of intermediate goods  = 067
Taylor rule: coeﬃcient on output  = 01
Taylor rule: interest rate smoothing  = 085
Share of non-traded goods in consumption basket  = 04
Elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded κ = 045
Share of government spending in output  = 02
Share of proﬁt taxes in total taxes  = 015
Elasticity of substitution between individual labor varieties  = 10
Calvo wage setting and indexation parameters  = 075  = 05
Calvo price setting and indexation parameters  = 075  = 05
Capital adjustment costs  = 025
Depreciation of real capital  = 0025
Capacity utilization costs z = 02
Labor supply shocks ∆ = 09 ∆ = 0025
Mark-up shocks  = 00  = 00015
Investment cost shocks  = 09  = 0001
Government spending shocks  = 09  = 0003
Risk premium shocks Υ = 00 Υ = 0006
Monetary shocks  = 00  = 00012
Productivity shocks
 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
09 0 06 0
0 09 0 06
0 0 09 0
0 0 0 09
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Σ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
00092 0 0 0
0 00092 0 0
0 0 00052 0
0 0 0 00052
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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Figure 2 shows that the basic result demonstrated in the simple example model holds in
the general model for the benchmark set of parameter values.
The portfolio expressions (25) and (26) can again be used to investigate the intuition for
the relationship between inﬂation stabilization and the size of equilibrium asset holdings.
Panels (c) to (h) of Figure 2 plot the relevant conditional moments. These ﬁgures show that
the basic properties of conditional moments are similar to those found in the simple example
model. Thus the conditional standard deviations of both bond and equity returns decline
as monetary policy becomes more focused on inﬂation stabilization. The behavior of the
conditional standard deviation of relative income is also similar to the simple model. The
conditional variability of relative income rises for both equities and bonds as  increases.
Panels (c) to (h) of Figure 2 therefore demonstrate that the underlying explanation for the
increase in gross positions is the same as in the simple example model, i.e. as the volatility of
inﬂation is reduced the conditional volatility of asset returns falls relative to the conditional
volatility of relative income and so it is necessary for households to hold larger gross positions
in equities and bonds in order to achieve the desired degree of risk sharing. This is again an
example of the volatility eﬀect.
The benchmark conﬁguration of our model has a similar basic structure to (but is much
more general than) the model used by Engel and Matsumoto (2009) to analyze equity home
bias, so it is useful to consider the implications of the results shown in Figure 2 for equity
home bias.25 For the benchmark parameter conﬁguration the total value of home equity is
approximately 18 times steady state GDP, so the equity position illustrated in Figure 2, panel
(a) is consistent with a degree of equity home bias for most of the range of  considered.26
But notice that one of the implications of the results illustrated in Figure 2 is that the degree
of equity home bias is sensitive to the variability of inﬂation. More speciﬁcally, equity home
bias is stronger when inﬂation is relatively volatile but declines as inﬂation is stabilized.
But there is a signiﬁcant minority of developed countries where the opposite pattern of bond holding is
observed.
25Our model includes non-traded goods, real capital, wage and price stickiness in the form of Calvo
contracts, a Taylor rule for monetary policy and a wider range of shocks compared to the model used by
Engel and Matsumoto. The main objective of Engel and Matsumoto (2009) is to show how nominal inertia
provides a possible explanation for home equity bias. They do not consider the role of monetary policy or
inﬂation volatility in determining the size of equity portfolios.
26At  = 2 panel (a) of Figure 1 shows external equity holdings are approximately 7 times steady state
GDP so the home country is holdings approximately 61% of home country equity. At  = 6 equity holdings
are approximately 9 times steady state GDP, so the home country holds approximately 50% of home country
equity. In each case the foreign country holds the same percentage of foreign equity as the home country
holds of home equity..
31
Figure 3 reports results for the LCP case with benchmark parameter values. The general
features of this case are similar to the PCP case. Both equity and bond holdings are positive
and increase in  (again except for equity holdings for very low values of ) The main
diﬀerence compared to the PCP case is that equity holdings are somewhat less sensitive,
and bond holdings are somewhat more sensitive to the increase in  Panels (g) and (h) of
Figure 3 show that the underlying explanation for the increase in the size of gross positions
is again the fact that increasing  and stabilizing inﬂation, tends to reduce the conditional
volatility of relative asset returns. Panels (g) and (h) of Figure 3 show that the conditional
volatility of both relative equity and relative bond returns decline as  increases. For bonds
and equities the conditional standard deviations of relative returns declines relative to the
conditional standard deviation of income, so again the increase in gross positions is caused
by the volatility eﬀect.
6.3 The correlation between relative income and asset returns
In their analysis of the welfare eﬀects of monetary policy, Devereux and Sutherland (2008)
note that, in a model which is a special case of the benchmark model presented above, the
size of the equilibrium gross position in bonds increases as the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in
the Taylor rule is increased. Devereux and Sutherland (2008) do not analyze this result
in any detail but they do oﬀer a simple intuition which appears to be diﬀerent from the
reasoning described above in relation to the results in Figure 2 and Figure 3. They suggest
that inﬂation volatility causes extraneous noise in the real return on bonds which partly
undermines the eﬃciency of bonds as a hedge against productivity shocks. They argue that
a monetary rule which focuses on inﬂation stabilization reduces the extraneous noise in bond
returns and therefore implies that bonds become a better hedge against productivity shocks.
Inﬂation stabilization therefore encourages an expansion of gross holdings of bonds.
Given the that the model described above contains the model used by Devereux and
Sutherland (2008) as a special case, it is important to trace the links between the intuition
oﬀered in Devereux and Sutherland (2008) and the intuition emphasized in this paper.27 In
27While Devereux and Sutherland (2008) analyze a model which is a special case of the model of the
current paper, they only comment very brieﬂy on the eﬀect of inﬂation stabilization on the size of gross
positions. In fact they only consider this issue very brieﬂy in relation to bond holdings in a special case
of their model. They do not decompose portfolio holdings using (25) and (26) and they oﬀer only a brief
intuition for the eﬀect of inﬂation stabilization on the size of gross positions. In contrast, the current paper
provides a comprehensive analysis of the links between inﬂation stabilization and gross positions in both
equities and bonds in a much more general model.
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fact the links between the two papers can be easily understood in terms of the volatility eﬀect
and the correlation eﬀect. The result emphasized in Devereux and Sutherland (2008) is an
example of the correlation eﬀect.
Figure 4 illustrates the Devereux and Sutherland (2008) result using a special case of the
model of this paper. In this special case there are shocks only to productivity and monetary
policy, the coeﬃcient on output in the Taylor rule, , is set to zero, productivity in the traded
and non-traded sectors is assumed to be perfectly correlated and nominal bonds are assumed
to be of one-period maturity (rather than the inﬁnite maturity assumed in the benchmark
model). These assumptions make the model of this paper more closely aligned to the model
used by Devereux and Sutherland (2008). Figure 4 illustrates the eﬀect of  on bond holdings
in this simpliﬁed model when asset trade is restricted to trade in home and foreign currency
bonds. Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that the absolute size of the gross position in bonds
is increasing in 28 As already explained, Devereux and Sutherland (2008) argue that the
underlying explanation for the increase in the (absolute) size of the gross position in bonds
is that bonds become a better hedge against productivity shocks as inﬂation is stabilized. In
other words, as  increases, the correlation between relative income and bond returns tends
towards +1 or -1. Panel (b) of Figure 4 shows that in fact the correlation tends towards -1.
And (26) shows that, other things being equal, this will cause an increase in the (absolute)
size of the gross bond position. The results illustrated in Figure 4 are therefore entirely
consistent with the intuition oﬀered by Devereux and Sutherland (2008).29
But notice from Figure 4 that the eﬀect of inﬂation stabilization that works through
the correlation between bond returns and relative income is not the only channel that links
inﬂation stabilization to the gross bond position. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4 show that
inﬂation stabilization also reduces the volatility of bond returns relative to the volatility of
relative income. This is exactly the volatility eﬀect emphasized above in relation to Figures
2 and 3. Equation (26) shows that, just as in the cases illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, a
reduction in the standard deviation of bond returns relative to the standard deviation of
relative income implies that the gross bond position must increase in order to achieve the
desired degree of risk sharing.
28In order to oﬀer a clear illustration of the Devereux and Sutherland (2008) result, Figure 6 shows a much
wider range for  than used in Figures 2 and 3.
29Devereux and Sutherland (2008) further emphasized that, if monetary policy were to stabilize inﬂation
completely, bonds would become a perfect hedge for productivity shocks. In other words perfect risk sharing
would be possible. In terms of the case illustrated in Figure 4, this would be the limiting case where  tends
to inﬁnity and there is perfect negative correlation between bond returns and relative income.
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Figure 4 shows therefore that the volatility eﬀect emphasized above (i.e. the impact
of inﬂation stabilization on the variability of asset returns) reinforces the correlation eﬀect
described by Devereux and Sutherland (2008) (i.e. the impact of inﬂation stabilization on
the correlation between asset returns and relative income).
Now re-consider the general case illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Previously we emphasized
the link between inﬂation stabilization and gross asset positions that operates through the
volatility eﬀect (i.e. the eﬀect of inﬂation stabilization and the variability of asset returns).
However, notice from panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2, that inﬂation stabilization also aﬀects
the correlation between asset returns and relative income. In fact, as  increases, it can
be seen that the correlation between bond returns and relative income increases from zero
towards +0.6. In other words, bonds become a better hedging instrument as inﬂation is
stabilized. As can be seen from (26), this reinforces the impact of inﬂation stabilization
on the gross position in bonds. This is the correlation eﬀect identiﬁed by Devereux and
Sutherland (2008). The eﬀect of  on the correlation between equity returns and income is
less clear from the ﬁgure but this also tends to increase as  increases. So the correlation
eﬀect is also contributing to the increase in the gross position in equities.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3 similarly show the correlation eﬀect in operation in the
LCP case. The general pattern is similar to the PCP case.
Note that the correlation eﬀect only arises when markets are incomplete. In the simple
cases illustrated in Section 5, where there are only productivity shocks and trade in either
equities and bonds, markets are complete. This implies that asset returns are perfectly
correlated with relative income regardless of the level of  In those cases the correlation
eﬀect is not present. The volatility eﬀect nevertheless continues to operate.
6.4 Generalizations
We have experimented with a wide range of parameter variations around the benchmark
values. Plausible variations in many of the model’s parameters have no signiﬁcant qualitative
or quantitative eﬀect on the relationship between  and gross asset positions. Rather than
catalogue every case, here we report only on those parameter variations where the results
diﬀer in a qualitatively signiﬁcant way from those reported above. We also comment on a
number of model variants.
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6.4.1 Parameter Variations
Although most macroeconomic evidence suggests that the elasticity of substitution between
baskets of traded goods produced in diﬀerent countries ( in our model) is close to unity,
there is no clear agreement in the literature on whether the empirically relevant value is
just above or just below unity. Our benchmark value,  = 15 is consistent with the values
used by Backus et al (1994) and Benigno and Thoenissen (2008) but Corsetti et al choose
 = 085. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 5 show the relationship between gross asset positions
and  when we set  = 085 (in the PCP case). It is apparent the sign of the bond position
has switched but the relationship between the absolute size of bond holdings and  is the
same as in the benchmark case, i.e. the absolute size of gross positions increase as inﬂation
is stabilized. The eﬀect of setting  = 085 in the LCP case is very similar and is not
illustrated.30
Our benchmark value for the Calvo pricing parameter,  = 075 is very standard and
implies that individual prices are changed on average every 4 quarters. Christiano et al
(2005) report a benchmark estimate for this parameter of 0.6 while Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2005, 2007) report an estimate of 09. Experiments show that setting a lower value
of  (consistent with Christiano et al, 2005) tends to reduce the sensitivity of gross equity
positions and increase the sensitivity of gross bond positions to  while a higher value of
 (consistent with Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2005, 2007) switches the sign of gross bond
positions (see panel (d) of Figure 5). In the latter case the absolute size of both equity and
bond positions continues to be increasing in 
The cases illustrated in Figure 5 panels (b) and (d) share the feature that the sign of
bond holdings is reversed compared to the benchmark case, but the absolute size of bond
holdings continues to be positively related to  The basic benchmark result is therefore
robust against empirically relevant variations in  and 
Experiments with the parameters of the monetary policy rule, and the variance of mon-
etary policy shocks, show, however, that in some circumstance the positive relationship
between the (absolute) size of gross asset positions and  can break down. Panels (e) to
(h) of Figure 5 show two particular cases. In panels (e) and (f) the parameter  which
determines the degree of inertia in interest rate setting, is set at the higher value of 095
30As noted earlier, Lane and Shambaugh (2010) show that many developed countries tend to be long in
foreign currency bonds and short in own currency bonds (i.e. the opposite sign to the holdings displayed
in panel (b) of Figure 5). However, Lane and Shambaugh also ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant minority of developed
countries are short in foreign currency bonds and long in own currency bonds, which is a pattern consistent
with panel (b) of Figure 5.
35
(the benchmark value is 085). In this case the relationship between equity holdings and 
is non-monotonic, ﬁrst falling and then rising, while bond holdings are negative and falling
in absolute value as  rises. Clarida et al (1998, 2000) estimates of  range between ap-
proximately 07 and 09 while Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate a value closer to 095.
However, Smets and Wouters (2005, 2008) ﬁnd  to be in the range 08 to 09.  = 095 is
therefore a the extreme upper end of the range of estimates from Clarida et al and Smets
and Wouters.
Panels (g) and (h) of Figure 5 show the case where the standard deviation of monetary
shocks is set at the higher value of 00024 (the benchmark value is 00012). In this case
the relationship between bond holdings and  is negatively sloped, while equity holdings
continue to be positively related to . Smets and Wouters’s (2003) estimate of the standard
deviation of monetary shocks to be 0001, while in Smets and Wouters (2005, 2008) their
estimates of the standard deviation are between 0001 and 00024, but most of their estimates
fall in the range 0001 to 00013. A standard deviation of 00024 is therefore at the extreme
upper end of the range of estimated values.
Apart from the two cases illustrated in Figure 5 panels (e) to (h), the benchmark results
appear to be robust against empirically relevant variations in all other parameters of the
model.
6.4.2 Model Variants
We now discuss the implications of a number of modiﬁcations to the structure of the bench-
mark model.
First consider the following alternative form of household utility function
 = 
∞P
=0

(
+
[+()− +−1]1−
1−  −∆+
1++ ()
1 + 
)
(32)
where  represents the stock of (external) habits and  is a shock to consumption prefer-
ences where  = ¯ exp(ˆ), ˆ = ˆ−1 + , 0    1 and  is a zero-mean normally
distributed i.i.d. shock with  [] = 2 .
Numerical experiments show that the relationship between asset holdings and  is unaf-
fected by the value of the habit parameter, . The benchmark results are therefore robust
to the introduction of consumption habits. Shocks to consumption preference do however
tend to reduce the sensitivity of equity holdings to  Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 6 show
the case where  = 09 and  = 0003 (which is in the middle of the range of estimates
of Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2005, 2007). The relationship between bond holdings and 
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is largely unaﬀected by the introduction of consumption preference shocks, while the rela-
tionship between equity holdings and  is somewhat ﬂatter than the benchmark case (and
is downward sloping for small values of )
A second variant of the benchmark model is one where international traded bonds are
short maturity (rather than the inﬁnite maturity assumed in the benchmark model). Panels
(c) and (d) of Figure 6 show the relationship between asset holdings and  in this case.
The ﬁgure show that bond holdings are negative in this case, but the absolute size of bond
holdings is increasing in  while the holdings of equities are somewhat less sensitive to 
than in the benchmark case (and is slightly downward sloping for higher values of ).
The ﬁnal two variants of the benchmark model considered involve changes to the mone-
tary policy rule. In the ﬁrst the inﬂation term in the rule is assumed to depend on producer
price inﬂation (rather than consumer price inﬂation). In the second the output gap term in
the rule is assumed to be measured relative to the ﬂexible price level of output (rather than
an exogenously ﬁxed measure of capacity output). Both these modiﬁcations to the policy
rule move the rule closer to the form that has been shown to be optimal in basic models of
monetary policy. It is important to note, however, that stabilizing producer price inﬂation
(PPI) is only optimal in quite restrictive cases and there is no reason to suppose that PPI
targeting is any closer to the optimal policy in the benchmark model than is CPI inﬂation
targeting.31 Likewise, stabilizing output around the ﬂexible price output level is only welfare
maximizing in restrictive circumstances and there is no reason to suppose that the ﬂexible
price output level is the welfare relevant target level of output in the benchmark model of
this paper. Furthermore, the monetary rule assumed in the benchmark model is adopted
because it is regarded as a good empirical representation of actual monetary policy over the
last few decades. The fact that it may not be a correct theoretical speciﬁcation of optimal
policy is not a relevant consideration for the purposes of this paper. Nevertheless it is useful
to consider the implications of alternative forms of policy rule for the relationship between
gross asset holdings and  These are illustrated in panels (e) to (j) of Figure 6.
Panels (e) and (f) of Figure 6 show the case where the inﬂation term in the policy rule
depends on producer price inﬂation (as measured by the rate of change of the GDP deﬂator).
It is apparent that equity holdings are negatively related to the value of  in this case, while
bond holdings continue to be positive and positively related to  Panels (g) and (h) show the
31An alternative argument for considering PPI targeting is that it more closely represents targeting of
‘core inﬂation’. However, the correspondence between the two concepts is not perfect because the producer
prices index (in this model) includes the price of goods produced for export, while ‘core inﬂation’ is typically
a measure of price inﬂation for domestic consumers.
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case where the output gap term in the policy rule depends on output measured relative to the
ﬂexible price output level. In this case equity holdings are quite insensitive to the value of 
while bond holdings are negative, with the absolute size of bond holdings positively related to
 Finally panels (i) and (j) show the case which combines the previous two, i.e. the inﬂation
term in the policy rule depends on producer price inﬂation and the output term depends on
the output measured relative the ﬂexible price equilibrium. In this case equity holdings are
positively related to  while the relationship between  and bond holdings is non-monotonic,
ﬁrst rising then falling for higher values of  Panels (e) to (j) of Figure 6 show that some
aspects of the benchmark results carry over to these alternative speciﬁcations of the policy
rule, but some also break down. However, as previously emphasized, these alternative forms
of the policy rule are of interest only because they have been identiﬁed as closer to the
optimum form of rule in simple models. Arguably, they are neither the empirically relevant
form of rule, nor are they necessarily the optimal form of rule in the model of this paper.
We conclude that many of the general properties illustrated for the benchmark model
and the benchmark parameter set are robust across a wide range of parameter and model
variations.
7 Discussion
Our model suggests that a more aggressive monetary policy which reduces the variability of
inﬂation in almost all cases leads to an increase in the absolute size of gross external asset and
liability positions. As we mentioned in the introduction, previous researchers have argued
that the causation may go in the other direction. Econometric evidence such as Tytell and
Wei (2004) ﬁnds that measures of ﬁnancial globalization have signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient
estimates in cross country inﬂation (level) equations. By contrast, our empirical evidence
ﬁnds that inﬂation variability is signiﬁcant in panel regressions of ﬁnancial globalization.
Sorting out the full set of causal links between the level of inﬂation, the variability of inﬂation,
and ﬁnancial globalization is beyond the scope of this paper. Both inﬂation and international
portfolio positions are endogenous and aﬀected by all aspects of the macroeconomy, and it
is diﬃcult to obtain robust instruments for both variables.32 Moreover, our theory by no
means precludes the possibility that there may be additional forces leading from international
32Our use of central bank independence as an instrument for inﬂation volatility in our regressions reported
in Section 2 provides some evidence of causation running from inﬂation variability to ﬁnancial globaliza-
tion. But a full empirical investigation of causation would obviously require robust instruments for all the
endogenous variables in the relationship.
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ﬁnancial globalization to inﬂation either directly or indirectly through endogenous monetary
policy. Our main point is that evidence suggesting that increased capital market openness
has been associated with reductions in average inﬂation rates does not necessarily establish
the direction of causation, since we have shown that there are strong theoretical reasons to
think that there may also be a link between inﬂation stability and the size of gross external
ﬁnancial positions.
The eﬀect of inﬂation variability on gross external assets depends on the correlation
and variability channels deﬁned above. Are these channels empirically relevant? There is
evidence of an increase in the co-movement of major world stock markets since the mid
1990s (see e.g. Kizys and Pierdzioch, 2009). This should be associated with a fall in the
variability of relative equity returns and is consistent with the volatility eﬀect we describe in
relation to equity holdings. The second component of the volatility eﬀect is determined by
the conditional variance of relative income across countries. One way to measure this would
be to look at business cycle co-movement across countries. Here, the results of the literature
are quite ambiguous. Heathcote and Perri (2002) and Stock and Watson (2003) ﬁnd that
business cycle co-movement among the major economies fell in the 1990’s relative to earlier
periods. In principal, this should lead to an increase in the conditional variance of relative
income across countries. However, using a wider sample of countries, Kose et al (2003) ﬁnd
that correlations tended to increase over time during the 1960-99 period. There is clearly
scope for a more detailed empirical investigation of the variability and correlation eﬀects in
terms of data on relative asset returns and relative income diﬀerences. We leave this topic
for future research.
The model used in this paper can be extended in a number of obvious directions which
may have important implications for the size of gross positions and the relationship between
gross positions and monetary policy. A particularly important issue which we have not
explored in any detail in this paper is the role of ﬁnancial frictions. The model includes
a ‘risk premium shock’ of the form proposed by Smets and Wouters (2003). This captures
some of the eﬀects of frictions which drive a wedge between the costs of internal and external
ﬁnance, but it fails to capture the endogenous nature of the ﬁnancial accelerator. The model
also does not capture any of the frictions that exist in international ﬁnancial markets, such
as transactions costs, informational asymmetries or limits on pledgeability than may give
rise to collateral constraints and wedges between international borrowing and lending rates.
While there is now quite an extensive literature which analyzes a range of ﬁnancial frictions
in the context of closed-economy models, there are relatively few contributions to the current
literature which model the international aspects of these frictions. Devereux and Sutherland
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(2011b) for instance analyze a model of international portfolio allocation where collateral
constraints exist at the international level. The model is, however, very simple and the form
of the collateral constraint considered is only one of a number of possible representations
of ﬁnancial frictions. At the current stage of development of this literature it is diﬃcult
to predict (with any degree of accuracy) how ﬁnancial frictions may aﬀect the relationship
between inﬂation variability and the size of gross positions. Again, we leave this topic for
future research.
8 Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between inﬂation variability and the size of external
asset positions. Panel regression results based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s data on gross
portfolios show a fairly robust negative relationship between inﬂation variability and the
size of gross positions. Using a general two-country dynamic general equilibrium model, we
solve for gross positions and show that the model predicts a relationship between inﬂation
variability and the size of gross positions which has the same general features as the data.
Our solutions show that the link between inﬂation variability and the size of gross positions
can be explained by a combination of a return volatility eﬀect and a return-income correlation
eﬀect. A reduction in inﬂation variability tends to reduce the variability of returns for both
bonds and equities. It is therefore necessary to hold larger positions in bonds and equities in
order to achieve the desired level of risk sharing. Lower inﬂation variability also reduces the
amount of extraneous noise in bond and equity positions and thus increases the correlation
between asset returns and relative income. This increases the hedging eﬃciency of both
bonds and equities and therefore increases equilibrium gross positions in bonds and equities.
The paper thus shows that there are strong theoretical reasons to think that there may
be a link between inﬂation stability and the size of gross external ﬁnancial positions, this
suggests that evidence that capital market openness has been associated with reductions in
average inﬂation rates does not necessarily establish the direction of causation.
40
Appendix
The unconditional one-period ahead covariance matrix of the vector [    ]0 can be
written as follows ⎡
⎢⎢⎣
2  
 2 
  2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Equation (24) implies
˜ = 1
2
Σ−1 cov(+1 +1) =
1
2
"
2 
 2
#−1 "


#
(33)
So
˜ =
1
2
2 − 
22 − 2
(34)
˜ =
1
2
2 − 
22 − 2
(35)
Following Eaton (2007) Section 3.4 it is possible to show that the covariance matrix of
the vector [   ]0 conditional on  is given by"
2 
 2
#
− 12
"


# h
 
i
=
⎡
⎣
22−2
2
2−
2
2−
2
22−2
2
⎤
⎦
from which it follows that
corr
¡
 |
¢
=
2−
(22−2)12(22−2)12
StDev
¡
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¢
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StDev
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
Substituting these expressions into (25) and simplifying yields (34).
Likewise the covariance matrix of the vector [   ]0 conditional on  is given by"
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Substituting these expressions into (26) and simplifying yields (35).
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Figure 5: Parameter variations.
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Figure 6: Model variants.
